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Abstract
When donating to charitable causes, people do not value lives consistently. Money is often concentrated on a single victim even
though more people would be helped, if resources were dispersed or spent protecting future victims. We examine the impact of delib-
erating about donation decisions on generosity. In a series of ﬁeld experiments, we show that teaching or priming people to recog-
nize the discrepancy in giving toward identiﬁable and statistical victims has perverse eﬀects: individuals give less to identiﬁable
victims but do not increase giving to statistical victims, resulting in an overall reduction in caring and giving. Thus, it appears that,
when thinking deliberatively, people discount sympathy towards identiﬁable victims but fail to generate sympathy toward statistical
victims.
  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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‘‘If I look at the mass, I will never act. If I look at the
one, I will.’’
— Mother Teresa
Charitiesstruggletoraisemoneytofeedthethousands
of starving children in third world countries and advo-
cates struggle to raise public support for highway safety
measures that would reduce future accident fatalities.
Yet, people often become entranced by speciﬁc, identiﬁ-
able, victims. In 1987, one child, ‘‘Baby Jessica,’’ received
over $700,000 in donations from the public, when she fell
in awell near her home in Texas. Similarly, the plight of a
wounded Iraqi boy, Ali Abbas, captivated the news
media in Europe during the Iraq conﬂict and £275,000
was quickly raised for his medical care. More than
$48,000 was contributed to save a dog stranded on a ship
adrift on the Paciﬁc Ocean near Hawaii (Song, 2002).
These cases demonstrate that when an identiﬁable
victim is made into a cause, people appear to be quite
compassionate and generous. However, at other times,
people appear rather self-interested and callous—giving
nothing despite the enormity of need. In this paper, we
examine the consequences of attempting to debias the
eﬀect by educating people about it—by teaching them
about the inconsistent sympathy evoked by statistical
and identiﬁable victims.
Debiasing the discrepancy in giving is important
because concentrating large sums of money on a single
victim is ineﬃcient. In many cases, society would be bet-
ter oﬀ, if resources were spread among victims such that
each additional dollar is spent where it will do the most
good. Yet, when making a decision to donate money
toward a cause, most people probably do not calculate
the expected beneﬁt of their donation. Rather, choices
are made intuitively, based on spontaneous aﬀective
reactions (see Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). To the extent that an
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move people to give, excessive resources are likely to be
allocated toward identiﬁable as compared to statistical
victims (Small & Loewenstein, 2003).
Can individuals be taught to value life consistently?
From a utilitarian perspective, it is straightforwardly
normative to value lives equivalently. However, there
is no ‘‘correct’’ value of a life or answer to the question
of how much one should give to help someone in need.
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the ‘‘identiﬁable vic-
tim eﬀect’’ is a bias to give too much to identiﬁable vic-
tims or to give too little to statistical victims. The bias is
simply that people care inconsistently. Therefore, an
interesting and practical second question concerns the
direction of correction for the eﬀect. To the extent that
debiasing the identiﬁable victim eﬀect does lead to a
more consistent treatment of statistical and identiﬁable
victims, will it tend to increase generosity toward statis-
tical victims or to decrease generosity toward identiﬁ-
able victims?
The identiﬁable victim eﬀect
Prior research delineates two contributing factors
behind the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. First, when valuing
life and other commodities with non-transparent market
values, people show greater sensitivity to proportions
than to absolute numbers of lives (Baron, 1997; Feather-
stonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Fried-
rich et al., 1999; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). For
example, an event or calamity that causes 10 deaths
within a very small community of 200 evokes a great
amount of concern. Ten deaths out of 200 is a fairly
large proportion. However, people exhibit much less
concern if that same event or calamity causes 10 deaths
throughout a large population of many million people.
Ten deaths out of many million is merely a ‘‘drop in
the bucket.’’
This ‘‘proportion of the reference group eﬀect’’
results, because it is diﬃcult to evaluate the goodness
of saving a stated number of lives, since an absolute
number of lives does not map easily on to an implicit
scale (Slovic et al., 2002). Proportions of lives are, how-
ever, at least superﬁcially easy to interpret, since the
scale ranges from 0 to 100%. A high proportion elicits,
for example, stronger support for life-saving interven-
tions, even when the absolute number of lives saved is
small. In contrast, interventions that save larger num-
bers of absolute lives but smaller numbers of relative
lives are likely to evoke weaker support.
For a proportion to dominate evaluation, a particular
reference group (denominator) must be salient. Intui-
tively, the reference group for an identiﬁable victim is
itself; there was only one ‘‘Baby Jessica’’ to be saved.
Therefore, an identiﬁable victim represents the highest
possible proportion of a reference group (1 of 1, or
100%). Extraordinarily generous behavior toward iden-
tiﬁable victims, then, could simply result from the ten-
dency for altruistic behavior to increase with the
proportion of the reference group.
In addition to the proportion eﬀect, there is also a
qualitative distinction between identiﬁable and statisti-
cal victims. Small and Loewenstein (2003) and Kogut
and Ritov (2005a) both found that the individuals gave
more to help an identiﬁable victim than a statistical vic-
tim, even when controlling for the reference group. In
one study, Small and Loewenstein (2003) modiﬁed the
dictator game to produce a situation in which fortunate
participants who retained their endowment could con-
tribute a portion of it to ‘‘victims’’ who had lost theirs.
The identity of victims (based solely on a number) either
had already been determined (identiﬁable) or was about
to be, but had not yet been, determined (unidentiﬁable).
Gifts to determined victims were signiﬁcantly greater
than gifts to undetermined victims. A ﬁeld experiment
examining donations to Habitat for Humanity to build
a house for a needy family replicated this result. Identi-
ﬁability was manipulated by informing respondents that
the family either ‘‘has been selected’’ or ‘‘will be select-
ed.’’ In neither condition were respondents told which
family had been or would be selected; the only diﬀerence
between conditions was in whether the decision had
already been made. Contributions to the charity were
signiﬁcantly greater, when the family had already been
determined. Kogut and Ritov (2005a) likewise found
that a single, identiﬁed victim (identiﬁed by a name
and face) elicited greater emotional distress and more
donations than a group of identiﬁed victims and more
than both a single and group of unidentiﬁed victims.
Moreover, emotional distress partially accounted for
diﬀerences in contributions.
This ﬁnding parallels our conjecture that identiﬁable
targets stimulate a more powerful emotional response
than do statistical targets. Recent dual process models
in social cognition identify two distinct modes of
thought: one deliberate and calculative and the other
aﬀective (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994;
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996). The aﬀec-
tive mode may dominate depending on a variety of fac-
tors, including when the target of thought is speciﬁc,
personal, and vivid (Epstein, 1994; Sherman, Beike, &
Ryalls, 1999). The deliberative mode, in contrast, is
more likely to be evoked by abstract and impersonal tar-
gets. The identiﬁable victim eﬀect, it seems, may result
from divergent modes of thought, with greater felt sym-
pathy for identiﬁable victims because they invoke the
aﬀective system.
Indeed, there is some evidence that identiﬁcation
intensiﬁes feelings. In a study that compared punitive
actions taken against statistical and identiﬁed perpetra-
tors (a target that evokes negative rather than positive
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anger toward identiﬁable perpetrators, and also found
that aﬀective reactions mediated the eﬀects of identiﬁ-
ability on punitiveness. Thus, it makes sense that the dis-
crepancy in giving toward identiﬁable and statistical
victims is similarly mediated by aﬀect (sympathy).
Two hypotheses
Several theorists, beginning with Zajonc (1980), have
proposed that the aﬀective system is a faster, more auto-
matic system, whose output occurs before the output of
the deliberate system, which involves slower, more
eﬀortful processing (see also Epstein, 1994; Shiv &
Fedorikhin, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson &
Brekke, 1994; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Oﬀ-
shoots of this research have also shown that it is possible
to ‘overshadow’ or suppress these initial aﬀective reac-
tions by inducing people to think in a deliberative fash-
ion (Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson et al., 2000). As a
body, this research suggests that inducing people to
weigh the scope of predicaments and to deliberate about
alternative uses for money might diminish the impact of
an aﬀective response toward identiﬁable victims. Yet,
the primacy of the aﬀective system also implies that
when an aﬀective reaction is initially weak, as is true
of sympathy toward statistical victims, then supplement-
ing this reaction with more deliberation should not
result in much of a diﬀerence, since this latter processing
is similarly unfeeling. This logic implies that reasoning
about identiﬁability is likely to have an asymmetric
eﬀect on generosity toward identiﬁable and statistical
victims, decreasing giving directed toward identiﬁed vic-
tims but not increasing it toward statistical victims. Such
an asymmetry lends itself to two predictions regarding
the eﬀects of debiasing identiﬁability:
Hypothesis 1. Thinking analytically about the value of
lives should reduce giving to an identiﬁable victim.
Hypothesis 2. Thinking analytically about the value of
lives should have no eﬀect on giving to statistical
victims.
These are the two central predictions that we test in
the four studies reported below.
Overview of studies
Each of the four studies attempted to manipulate the
level of analytic thought when people made decisions
involving statistical and identiﬁable victims. Study 1
examines the impact on generosity toward statistical
and identiﬁable victims of explicitly informing people
about the identiﬁable victim eﬀect. Study 2 rules out a
potential artifactual explanation for the ﬁndings from
Study 1. Study 3 attempts to teach the same lesson in
an implicit, rather than explicit manner. By providing
victim statistics alongside of a request for donations to
an identiﬁable victim, we confront individuals with both
targets, but do not directly inform them of any bias.
Finally, Study 4 examines how priming a calculating
mode of thought versus a feeling mode of thought inﬂu-
ences donation decisions to both presentations of targets
(identiﬁable and statistical).
Study 1
This study examined generosity toward an identiﬁ-
able victim or statistical victims following an interven-
tion that taught donors about the tendency for
individuals to give more to identiﬁable victims than to
statistical victims. We tested the eﬀects of the interven-
tion on giving behavior toward both presentations of
victims.
Method
The experiment consisted of a 2 · 2 between subjects
design. The ﬁrst factor was identiﬁability, each partici-
pant received a description of either an identiﬁable or
a statistical victim. The second factor was the interven-
tion, half of the participants received a brief lesson
about research demonstrating a discrepancy in giving
toward identiﬁable and statistical victims, the other half
received no such intervention.
Participants
An experimenter approached individuals (N = 121),
who were seated alone, in the student center at a univer-
sity in Pennsylvania and asked them if they would com-
plete a short survey in exchange for $5.00. The
experimenters knew that there were diﬀerent versions
of the charity request, but did not know which version
each participant received and was not informed about
the speciﬁc research hypotheses.
Procedures
Participants completed a survey about their use of
various technological products. The survey was wholly
unrelated to the present research and contained no
experimental manipulations. After completing the sur-
vey, each participant received ﬁve one-dollar bills, a
receipt, a blank envelope, and a charity request letter.
The experimenter instructed the participant to read the
letter carefully before signing the receipt and then to
return both the letter and receipt sealed in the envelope.
The letter informed the participant of the opportunity
to donate any of their just earned ﬁve dollars to the
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told that ‘‘any money donated will go toward relieving
the severe food crisis in Southern Africa and Ethiopia.’’
The donations in fact went directly to Save the Children.
Intervention
Half of the participants (randomly assigned) ﬁrst read
a brief lesson about the research on identiﬁability. The
lesson consisted of the following text:
We’d like to tell you about some research conducted by
social scientists. This research shows that people typical-
ly react more strongly to speciﬁc people who have prob-
lems than to statistics about people with problems. For
example, when ‘‘Baby Jessica’’ fell into a well in Texas in
1989, people sent over $700,000 for her rescue eﬀort.
Statistics—e.g., the thousands of children who will
almost surely die in automobile accidents this coming
year—seldom evoke such strong reactions.
Identiﬁability
In the statistical victim condition, the charity request
letter described factual information taken from the
Save the Children website (http://www.savethechildren.
org/) about the problems of starvation in Africa. In
the identiﬁable victim condition, participants saw a pic-
ture of a little girl and read a brief description about
her. Again, the picture and description were taken
directly from the website. The stimuli are reproduced
in the appendix.
Finally, the letter instructed all participants:
Now that you have had the opportunity to learn about
how any money you donate will be used, please ﬁll out
the following page and include it with any money you
donate in the envelope you have been given. Even if
you do not choose to donate, please ﬁll out the form
and return it to us in the envelope.
The following page asked participants to indicate the
amount of their donation, $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5. Then,
participants were asked several questions about their
aﬀective and moral reactions to the situation described
on a 5-point likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to
5 (Extremely). The questions included: (1) How upset-
ting is this situation to you? (2) How sympathetic did
you feel while reading the description of the cause? (3)
How much do you feel it is your moral responsibility
to help out with this cause? (4) How touched were you
by the situation described? and (5) To what extent do
you feel that it is appropriate to give money to aid this
cause? These ﬁve items produced a reliable scale
(a = .87), which we heretofore will refer to as feelings.
The experimenter gave the participant space and a
few minutes to read the letter, and to donate privately
the amount that they chose without any social pressure
from the experimenter to give.
Results and discussion
Fig. 1 presents means for each of the four treatments.
To assess the eﬀects of the manipulations on giving
behavior, we subjected participants’ donations to a
2(identiﬁability) · 2(intervention) ANOVA. Both fac-
tors, identiﬁability and the intervention, resulted in main
eﬀects. Participants who faced an identiﬁable victim
gave more (M = $2.12, SD = $2.13) than those who
faced a statistical victim, (M = $1.21, SD = 1.67),
F(1,115) = 6.75, p < .05, g2
p ¼ .06; The intervention
reduced donations (M = $1.31, SD = $1.82) relative
to no intervention (M = $2.00, SD = $2.03), F(1,115) =
4.15, p < .05, g2
p ¼ .04. However, as revealed by a signif-
icant interaction between the treatments (F(1,115) =
5.32, p < .05, g2
p ¼ .04), the intervention had an
asymmetric impact on generosity in the two
identiﬁable conditions; learning about identiﬁability
decreased giving only toward identiﬁable victims.
Post-hoc contrast tests reveal a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the identiﬁable/no intervention cell
(M = $2.83, SD = $2.10) and the other three
(M = $1.26, SD = $1.74), t(117) =  4.06, p < .001.
Given the large number of zeros in the dependent var-
iable and the non-normal distribution, we also analyzed
the data with an ordered probit regression (Kennedy,
1998). The results were consistent with those obtained
using simple ANOVA, there was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
identiﬁability X
2(1) = 10.06, p < .01, no eﬀect of the
intervention X
2(1) = .01, p = .92, and a signiﬁcant inter-
action between identiﬁability and the intervention
X
2(1) = 4.72, p < .03. In all subsequent studies, we also
replicated the main analyses with ordered probit and
obtained qualitatively similar results, but report only
the ANOVA results.
A two-way ANOVA with feelings as the dependent
variable revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀects for either
the identiﬁability factor [F(1,114) = 1.80, p = .18] or
the intervention [F(1,114) = .24, p = .63], and the inter-
action term was insigniﬁcant as well, F(1,114) = 2.00,
p = .16. The same pattern held, when the feelings factor
$1.17
$2.83
$1.26
$1.36
$0.00
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$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
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Statistical victim Identifiable victim
No intervention
Intervention
Fig. 1. Eﬀects of teaching about identiﬁability on donations in
Study 1.
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up the feelings scale. However, correlations between
feelings and donations reveal an interesting pattern. In
the three cells for which donations were relatively low
(statistical/no intervention, statistical/intervention, and
identiﬁable/intervention), the Pearson correlation
between the factor score of the 5 feelings items and dona-
tions are all relatively small (.39, .33, and .34, respective-
ly). However, in the identiﬁable/no intervention
condition, the correlation between feelings and giving
is relatively strong, r = .55, p < .01. This is at least sug-
gestive that aﬀect and behavior are particularly linked
when people face an identiﬁable victim.
These results are consistent with our prediction that
forcing people to think more analytically about the
choice to give has an asymmetric eﬀect. Reactions to
the aﬀective target, the identiﬁable victim, were nega-
tively aﬀected by the teaching intervention, but reactions
to the non-aﬀective target, statistical victims, were not
aﬀected signiﬁcantly.
Study 2
A limitation of the ﬁrst study is a potential demand
eﬀect that we were made aware of after running it. Par-
ticipants may have attempted to correct for their gut
intentions about how much to give to please the
researchers after learning about the bias. If this were
true, one would expect participants to give more to sta-
tistical victims in addition to giving less to identiﬁable
victims. However, it is possible that participants
inferred that the bias was speciﬁcally located on dona-
tions to identiﬁable victims. The intervention stated
that people give ‘‘more’’ to identiﬁable victims than
to statistical victims, and ‘‘more’’ could potentially be
interpreted as ‘‘too much.’’ If this is true, then the
results of Study 1 may simply be due to experimental
demand rather than to learning about identiﬁability
per se.
If the intervention in Study 1 had stated ‘‘People give
less to statistical victims’’ rather than stating the equiv-
alent but alternatively-framed ‘‘People give more to
identiﬁable victims,’’ would the results have been the
reverse? Indeed, a large body of research demonstrates
the powerful inﬂuence of cognitive frames on judgment.
In the current study, we test whether alternative frames
used to describe the bias in the intervention would aﬀect
the level of donations.
Method
Study 2 employed a 2 · 2 factorial design manipulat-
ing (a) identiﬁability and (b) frame of the intervention.
Half of participants were exposed to an identiﬁable vic-
tim and the other half to statistical victims. Since the
purpose was to test diﬀerences among frames in the
intervention rather than comparing the presence versus
the absence of an intervention, as in Study 1, all individ-
uals received a teaching intervention. For half of the
participants, the discrepancy in giving described in the
intervention was framed as ‘‘more to identiﬁable vic-
tims.’’ For the other half, the discrepancy was framed
as ‘‘less to statistical victims.’’
Participants
As in Study 1, a hypothesis-blind experimenter
approached individuals in public places around a uni-
versity in Pennsylvania and asked them to complete a
short survey in exchange for $5. The sample consist-
ed of 99 individuals who consented to ﬁll out the
survey.
Procedures
The basic procedures followed those in Study 1.
After participants completed their surveys, the exper-
imenter paid them $5 in one-dollar bills and gave
them a receipt, an envelope and a charity request let-
ter. The experimenter instructed them to read the let-
ter and to return it with the receipt sealed in the
envelope.
Framing the intervention
To test for the possibility that the response to the
intervention revealed in Study 1 was due to the frame
of the intervention, we manipulated the frame between
subjects. Half of the participants read an intervention
with the frame more to identiﬁable victims:
...research shows that people typically react more
strongly to speciﬁc people who have problems than to
statistics about people with problems. For example,
when ‘‘Baby Jessica’’ fell into a well in Texas in 1989,
people sent over $700,000 for her rescue eﬀort. Statis-
tics—e.g., the 10,000 children who will almost surely
die in automobile accidents this coming year—seldom
evoke such strong reactions.
The other half read the alternative less to statistical
victims frame:
...research shows that people typically react less strong-
ly to statistics about people with problems than to spe-
ciﬁc people who have problems. For example,
statistics—e.g., the 10,000 children who will almost sure-
ly die in automobile accidents this coming year—seldom
evoke strong reactions. However, when ‘‘Baby Jessica’’
fell into a well in Texas in 1989, people sent over
$700,000 for her rescue eﬀort.
All other information described about the cause was
identical to Study 1.
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Fig. 2 presents the basic pattern of results. We per-
formed a 2(identiﬁability) · 2(frame) ANOVA on dona-
tions. Although there appears to be a main eﬀect of
identiﬁability ondonationsinthegraph,statisticalanaly-
sis revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀects for either factor
[F(1,95) = .073, p = .79 and F(1,95) = 1.00, p = .32,
respectively], nor a statistical interaction [F(1,95) = .01,
p = .94]. Most importantly, there is no observable trend
in the data toward giving more to identiﬁable victims
(either relatively or absolutely) under the ‘‘more’’ than
underthe‘‘less’’frame.Wefurthertestedforsimpleeﬀects
ofidentiﬁabilitywithineachframe.Theframedidnotsig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect donations to statistical victims
[F(1,95) = .073, p = .79] nor did it aﬀect donations to
identiﬁable victims [F(1,95) = 1.009, p = .32].
The lack of any eﬀect of framing in this study indi-
cates that the results of the intervention in Study 1 can-
not be attributed to the frame of the intervention or
experimental demand. Although framing is clearly
important in many contexts, framing a discrepancy as
more to X versus less to Y does not appear to matter.
If the intervention had stated that individuals typically
give too much to identiﬁable victims, then experimental
demand would be expected. However the terms ‘‘more’’
and ‘‘less’’ convey little about the correct level of giving
so subjects cannot gain insight about the desired eﬀect of
the researchers.
Study 3
In Study 3, we attempt to debias identiﬁability in a
more implicit manner. Rather than explicitly teaching
participants about the discrepancy, we preceded a
request for money for an identiﬁable victim with the
simultaneous presentation of both victim statistics and
a description of the identiﬁable victim.
Kogut and Ritov (2005b) gave some individuals an
opportunity to give any amount or nothing to either
or both a single, identiﬁed victim or a group of identiﬁed
victims, while others only had the option of giving to
one of the two targets (single or group). Although, they
gave more to a single identiﬁed victim than to a group of
identiﬁed victims when evaluated separately, they gave
similar amounts to each when evaluated jointly. More-
over, more people donated and the mean donation
was higher in separate evaluation than in joint evalua-
tion. This result suggests that comparative evaluation
blunts caring, possibly because it requires analytic,
deliberative thought.
In the present study, we jointly present an identiﬁed
victim with victim statistics. It is possible that this dou-
ble presentation could have an additive eﬀect, such that
participants would give the most when faced with great-
est information. However, we hypothesized that this
presentation would reduce caring, since the provision
of victim statistics would remind potential donors of
the many other victims who would not receive help. This
joint presentation should force people to compare the
relative importance of helping one victim to the impor-
tance of helping the multitudes.
Method
This study consisted of three conditions: (1) Identiﬁ-
able victim, (2) Statistical victims, and (3) Identiﬁable
victim with statistical information. The third condition
served as the ‘‘implicit’’ intervention.
Participants
A hypothesis-blind experimenter approached indi-
viduals, who were seated alone, in the university center
and courtyard at a University in Pennsylvania, and
asked if they would complete a short survey in
exchange for $5.00. A total of 159 individuals agreed
to participate.
Procedures
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants completed a sur-
vey about their use of various technological products.
Again after completing the survey, each participant
received ﬁve one-dollar bills, a receipt, a blank envelope,
and a charity request letter, informing the participant of
the opportunity to donate to Save the Children.
The stimuli for the identiﬁable victim and the statisti-
cal victims were identical to those used in Studies 1 and
2. In the identiﬁable victim with statistical information
condition, the request was identical to the identiﬁable
victim condition, with the addition of the statistical
information provided in the statistical victim condition.
In other words, participants faced a choice of whether to
help an identiﬁable victim, but were confronted by vic-
tim statistics before making a choice. Once again, the
letter instructed all participants to indicate on paper
$1.12 $1.00
$1.43 $1.37
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
Statistical victim Identifiable victim
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Less
Fig. 2. Null eﬀects of framing on donations in Study 2.
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any money they donated in an envelope.
Results and discussion
The main hypothesis in this study is that showing sta-
tistical information in conjunction with an identiﬁable
victim will reduce giving relative to just showing an iden-
tiﬁable victim. The means for the three conditions,
reported in Fig. 3, are consistent with this pattern. We
conducted a one-way ANOVA on donations, which
revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of identiﬁability
F(2) = 5.67, p < .01. g2
p ¼ .07. We then performed Bon-
ferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons, which revealed
that individuals who faced an identiﬁable victim donat-
ed more than those who faced victim statistics, p < .01,
and also donated more than those who faced an identi-
ﬁable victim in conjunction with statistics, p < .05. Thus,
the main hypothesis was supported. There was no diﬀer-
ence between individuals, who faced statistics only and
those who faced an identiﬁable victim in conjunction
with victim statistics, p = 1.0.
Apparently, statistical information dampens the incli-
nation to give to an identiﬁable victim. This result is
consistent with the tendency to give less to an identiﬁ-
able victim after learning about the discrepancy in giv-
ing. When jointly evaluating statistics and an
individual victim, the cause evidently becomes less com-
pelling. This could occur in part because statistics dimin-
ish the reliance on one’s aﬀective reaction to the
identiﬁable victim when making a decision.
We have argued that asymmetric eﬀects of the
intervention in this and the previous two studies result
from processing diﬀerences inherent in reactions to
the two victim presentations. However, an alternative
explanation is possible. Perhaps people do not con-
tribute to the statistical victims, because they feel that
any contribution would not make an appreciable con-
tribution to the problem. Such an account would be
consistent with the literature, reviewed earlier, show-
ing that people are sensitive not only to the absolute
number of victims but to the size of the reference
group (Baron, 1997; Featherstonhaugh et al., 1997;
Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). In fact, such a ‘drop in
the bucket’ eﬀect may also have contributed to the
discrepancy in treatment of the statistical versus iden-
tiﬁable victims in the ﬁrst two studies, though it is
diﬃcult to explain the eﬀect of the teaching interven-
tion in such terms. In the next study, we avoid this
possible confound by directly manipulating modes of
processing information (e.g., feeling based vs. calcula-
tion based).
Study 4
Unlike the previous studies in this paper, Study 4
does not incorporate an attempt to teach individuals
about the identiﬁability eﬀect, either explicitly or implic-
itly. Instead, we use an intervention designed to induce
either a calculation-based or a feeling-based mode of
thought. By doing so, we test whether it is possible to
reverse the dominant reaction to each victim presenta-
tion. Importantly, this approach avoids the confound
just discussed between modes of processing and the drop
in the bucket eﬀect. We would not expect the latter to be
aﬀected by an intervention targeted only at mode of
processing.
Altering mode of thought could lead to several diﬀer-
ent patterns. First, it could have no eﬀect on giving, if
the initial response to a presentation of a cause is pow-
erful and uncompromising. If instead, processing modes
are ﬂexible and only loosely dependent on the target,
then inducing feeling-based processing could lead to
greater caring and giving, whereas inducing calcula-
tion-based processing could lead to reduced caring and
giving.
We contend, in accordance with the primacy of
aﬀect, that it should be more feasible to reverse reac-
tions based on feeling than to add feelings where they
do not automatically arise. If this reasoning is correct,
then inducing a calculating mode should lessen caring
toward identiﬁable victims, since the impact of the ini-
tial aﬀective reaction to them can be mitigated by
deliberate thinking. Caring about statistical victims,
in contrast, should be less amenable to induced
feeling.
Methods
This study employed a priming task developed by
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) to manipulate a calculat-
ing mode versus a feeling mode of processing. This prim-
ing task was crossed with a manipulation of
identiﬁability, such that the design was a 2(identiﬁabili-
ty) · 2(priming) between-subjects design.
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Fig. 3. Donations to separate and joint presentation of victim types in
Study 3.
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Students and other people on campus at a University
in Pennsylvania (N = 165) were recruited to complete a
few short questionnaires. Each received a packet of
questionnaires and received $5 in one dollar bills for
participating.
Procedures
The questionnaire packet consisted ﬁrst of the survey
on the use of technology as in Studies 1, 2, and 3. Sec-
ond, in the packet was a short questionnaire which
served as the priming manipulation. In the calculation-
priming condition, the questionnaire was entitled ‘‘Cal-
culations Questionnaire.’’ It instructed participants to
work ‘‘carefully and deliberatively to calculate the
answers to the questions posed below’’: Five questions
followed, which were all similar to the ﬁrst one: ‘‘If an
object travels at ﬁve feet per minute, then by your calcu-
lations how many feet will it travel in 360 seconds?
_____ feet.’’
Inthefeeling-primingcondition,thequestionnairewas
entitled ‘‘Impression Questionnaire’’ and instructed par-
ticipantsto‘‘baseyouranswerstothefollowingquestions
on the feelings you experience’’: Representative of these
questions was: ‘‘When you hear the word ‘‘baby’’ what
doyoufeel?Pleaseuseonewordtodescribeyourpredom-
inant feeling: _________________.’’
After completing the packet, including the prime,
participants received $5 in one dollar bills an envelope,
a receipt and a charity request of the same nature as
the previous studies, which they were instructed to read
before leaving, as in previous studies. The procedure for
donating their earnings by sealing it in the envelope
anonymously was identical to the previous studies.
Results and discussion
As is evident from Fig. 4, which presents means for
the four conditions, the results support our hypotheses
that calculative thought lessens the appeal of an identi-
ﬁable victim, but feeling-based thought does not
improve the appeal of statistical victims. A two-way
ANOVA revealed that the priming manipulation had a
marginal eﬀect on generosity, F(1,160) = 3.49,
p = .063, g2
p ¼ .02, and no main eﬀect of victim type,
F(1,160) = .87, p = .35, g2
p ¼ .01. However, the primes
interacted with victim type, F(1,160) = 4.67, p < .04,
g2
p ¼ .03. When primed to calculate, participants donat-
ed signiﬁcantly less to the identiﬁable victim then when
primed to feel, F(1,160) = 3.49, p < .01, g2
p ¼ .05. How-
ever, priming had no eﬀect on donations to statistical
victims, F(1,160) = .87, p = .35, g2
p ¼ .01.
These results strongly support the notion that modes
of processing, and speciﬁcally the distinction between
aﬀect and deliberation, play an important role in the
identiﬁable victim eﬀect and in the impact of explicit
and implicit education about the eﬀect. Priming analytic
thinking reduced donations to an identiﬁable victim rel-
ative to a feeling-based thinking prime. Yet, the primes
had no distinct eﬀect on donations to statistical victims,
which is symptomatic of the diﬃculty in generating feel-
ings for these victims.
General discussion
Certain victims trigger a disproportionate level of
sympathy. In the current paper, we ﬁnd that debiasing,
through deliberative thinking, reduces the discrepancy
in giving to statistical and identiﬁable victims. We con-
tend that deliberative thinking reduces the reliance on
sympathy when evaluating an identiﬁable victim.
Our ﬁndings resonate with the ‘aﬀect heuristic’ (Slo-
vic et al., 2002) and the ‘feelings as information’ (Sch-
warz & Clore, 1983) frameworks. Consistent with the
aﬀect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002), stimuli that generate
sympathetic aﬀect induce individuals to place a high val-
ue on the identiﬁable victim.
A key aspect of the ‘‘feelings as information’’ frame-
work (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) is that the impact of feel-
ings on evaluative judgments depends on the perceived
informational value of the feelings. The ﬁnding from
our studies that generosity is reduced when additional
information is given, either in the form of an interven-
tion (Study 1) or additional statistics (Study 3), could
be interpreted in such terms. Perhaps these interventions
led people to believe that their feelings were less relevant
to the decision of how much to give than was true in the
absence of the interventions.
The ﬁnding that sympathetic reactions are under-
mined by deliberative thinking further supports the
two systems approach, in which an aﬀective response
can be blunted or controlled through thoughtful deliber-
ation (see Epstein, 1994; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999;
Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson et al., 2000). Although
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Fig. 4. Donations following processing primes in Study 4.
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intervention, it is possible that the feelings persevered. In
a study on prejudice, Wilson et al. (2000) demonstrated
that initial negative information that was later deemed
to be false had a lasting impression at an implicit level
but not an explicit level. Essentially, people could over-
ride the discredited initial aﬀective attitude when they
had capacity and motivation, but the aﬀective attitude
persevered in implicit attitude measures. Thus, the
reduction in donations to an identiﬁable victim follow-
ing intervention in our studies may represent a change
only in the explicit attitudes of participants.
An unresolved question is how people manage their
sympathy and prevent it from contaminating their judg-
ments and decisions. Wilson, Gilbert, and Wheatley
(1998) outline ﬁve strategies which people believe they
can adopt to avoid contamination: exposure control,
preparation, resistance, remediation, and behavior con-
trol. Any of these might be involved in our interven-
tions. Participants could have skipped over the charity
request after reading the intervention as a means to con-
trol exposure to the sympathetic plea; they could pre-
pare themselves by strengthening their mental defenses
against their feelings and resist their feelings once
exposed; ﬁnally, they could attempt to undo the eﬀects
of their sympathy and/or attempt to prevent their feel-
ings from inﬂuencing their behavior. Future research
could tease apart the mix of mental strategies involved
in correcting for unwanted sympathy when trying to
make eﬃcient and fair decisions.
Our ﬁndings also dovetail with research on propor-
tional reasoning, which shows that people value lives
less as the denominator of the proportion increases
(Baron, 1997; Featherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Friedrich
et al., 1999; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997). For example,
Study 3 in this paper demonstrates that providing sta-
tistics reduced generosity toward an identiﬁable vic-
tim. One possible mechanism through which this
eﬀect may have occurred is by eﬀectively priming a
large denominator. However, our other studies show
that other methods (explicit teaching and inducing
an analytic mindset) that are unlikely to prime large
denominators have a similar eﬀect. Thus, while the
proportion eﬀect undoubtedly contributes to the dis-
proportionate weight placed on identiﬁable victims,
it is unlikely that it, alone, accounts for the identiﬁ-
able victim eﬀect.
Implications for social welfare
The results from these studies might appear to be
somewhat discouraging. On the one hand, teaching
about identiﬁability led individuals to donate similar
amounts regardless of whether victims were identiﬁable
or not. Hence, it at least increased people’s consistency
toward the two types of victims. Yet, the intervention
had a pernicious eﬀect on overall caring, since people
gave less after each of our interventions in the identiﬁ-
able condition, but gave no more to statistical victims.
Insight, in this situation, seems to breed callousness.
In some ways, this conclusion seems well founded.
Faced with almost any disaster of any magnitude, it is
almost always possible to think of worse things that
have happened or even that are currently happening in
the world. The deaths of 9/11, for example, compared
with the slaughter in Rwanda, seem almost inconse-
quential. But the slaughter in Rwanda, in turn, is dwar-
fed by the problem of AIDS in Africa. Thinking about
problems analytically can easily suppress sympathy for
smaller-scale disasters without, our research suggests,
producing much of an increase in caring for larger-scale
disasters.
However, we believe that this simple interpretation is
probably somewhat oﬀ the mark. A more precise
account of what is going on is that, in certain situations,
aﬀective responses to victims diverge from more deliber-
ative responses. It is possible that deliberate thinking
could sometimes lead to more charity. For example,
contrary to the diﬀerence between statistical and identi-
ﬁable victims, we often experience little visceral sympa-
thy for needy victims who are from other countries or
of a diﬀerent race or socioeconomic status, but thinking
about their plight may lead us to recognize their deserv-
ingness. In such instances, we conjecture, interventions
that encourage deliberate thinking like those presented
in the four studies just presented might lead to greater
generosity rather than less.
Some support for this is evident in a study by Skitka,
Mullen, Griﬀen, Hutchinson, and Chamberlin (2002). In
this study, participants read about a number of individ-
uals with AIDS who diﬀered in how they contracted the
disease. For each case, participants judged whether the
individual was to blame for their situation and how
deserving he/she was of subsidies for drug treatment.
Half of the participants performed this task while under
cognitive load, thereby reducing the ability for deliber-
ate thinking. Under cognitive load, both self-described
liberals and conservatives were less likely to provide sub-
sidies to blameworthy than to non-blameworthy individ-
uals. Conservatives followed the pattern without load,
yet, liberals provided just as much assistance to blame-
worthy individuals as to non-blameworthy individuals.
Thus, deliberative thinking increased generosity, at least
for liberals.
Other evidence that deliberation can generate aﬀect
comes from Drolet and Luce (2004). They ﬁnd that cog-
nitive load mitigates the aﬀective turmoil of emotion-
laden trade-oﬀ decisions. This suggests that aﬀect does
not always have primacy. Rather, in certain cases cogni-
tive resources are necessary to generate aﬀect. Future
research would beneﬁt from delineating when aﬀect is
automatic and when requires deliberation.
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Improvements to social welfare could certainly be
made, if dollars of aid were shifted from identiﬁable vic-
tims like Baby Jessica and Ali Abbas to other more des-
perate victims. However, it is possible that the failure to
equate marginal beneﬁts per aid dollar is still consistent
with a ‘‘second best’’ optimum (Loewenstein, Small, &
Strnad, 2006). Although the money spent on Baby Jessi-
ca and Ali Abbas could save more lives in theory if not
concentrated as such, the absence of identiﬁability
eﬀects might reduce the impetus to give at all. Thus,
although victim identiﬁcation may distort aid allocation
somewhat, its impact generates more aid than any other
pitch. Charities certainly recognize this, at least implicit-
ly, when they employ a poster child to raise money for a
general cause.
Conclusion
In sum, our results demonstrate that sympathy for
identiﬁable victims diminishes with deliberative
thought, but remains consistently low for statistical vic-
tims. This pattern holds with various manipulations of
deliberative thought, including explicit debiasing inter-
ventions, providing statistics, and priming an analytic
mindset.
These ﬁndings support the more general notion that
certain stimuli naturally evoke more aﬀect than others
and that cognitive deliberation can undermine out-
comes that typically arise when choices are made aﬀec-
tively. In this case, encouraging people to think about
their choices had an unfavorable eﬀect on social wel-
fare. Future research is likely to reveal conditions in
which deliberation increases generosity and yields
social beneﬁts.
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Appendix A. Statistical Victim
Food shortages in Malawi are aﬀecting more than
three million children.
In Zambia, severe rainfall deﬁcits have resulted in a
42 percent drop in maize production from 2000. As a
result, an estimated three million Zambians face hunger.
Four million Angolans—one third of the popula-
tion—have been forced to ﬂee their homes.
More than 11 million people in Ethiopia need imme-
diate food assistance.
Appendix B. Identiﬁable Victim
Any money that you donate will go to Rokia, a
7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa. Rokia is desperately
poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starva-
tion. Her life will be changed for the better as a result of
your ﬁnancial gift. With your support, and the support
of other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work
with Rokia’s family and other members of the commu-
nity to help feed her, provide her with education, as well
as basic medical care and hygiene education.
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